Laws that decriminalize public drunkenness continue to use the police as the major intake agent for public inebriates under the "new" public health model of detoxification and treatment. Assuming that decriminalization introduces many disincentives to police intervention using legally sanctioned procedures, we hypothesize that it will be followed by a statistically significant decline in the number of public inebriates formally handled by the police in the manner designated by the "law in the books."
I. INTRODUCTION
Decriminalization as an alternative strategy for handling public drunkenness took hold in the 1960s and early 1970s (Kittrie, 1971 ; Morris and Hawkins, 1969; Schur, 1965; Schur and Bedau, 1974) .1 The regional and national forces that coalesced around this issue as reform-oriented policy subsystems (Freeman, 1965; Fritschler, 1969) focused on both the illegitimacy and impracticability of the attempts by the system of criminal justice to handle this social and public health problem (Nimmer, 1971:102-5) . In states where decriminalization eventually ocThis article is based on a larger study of the decriminalization of public drunkenness funded by LEAA-NILECJ, Grant No. 74NI-99-0055. Those parts of the study that deal with police discretion as an explanation for the impact of decriminalization, and with the analysis of alternative policies for dealing with the pickup and delivery of public inebriates, are contained in our final report (Aaronson et al., 1977b) and in another journal (Aaronson et al., 1977a (Aaronson et al., , 1978 . We gratefully acknowledge the many persons who commented on earlier drafts and criticized the methodological development of this paper-Richard Abel, Egon Bittner, Bruce Bowen, Gene Glass, Dorothy Guyot, Michael Hindus, Laura Irwin, James Levine, Dennis Palumbo, David Perry, H. Laurence Ross, Peter Rossi, Charles Ruttenberg, and George Silberman. curred either through legislation or judicial action, reformers paid little attention to the potential reaction of the police. They simply assumed that the police would continue to serve as intake agents for public inebriates under the "new" public health model of detoxification and treatment.
This article empirically evaluates the impact of decriminalization on police performance in Washington, D.C., and Minneapolis, Minnesota. We question the facile assumption that the police will routinely perform this new task. Specifically, we hypothesize that decriminalization will be followed by a statistically significant decline in the number of public inebriates formally handled by the police in the manner designated by the "law in the books."
The conceptual basis for this hypothesis is derived from the literature on organization theory and from studies of police behavior.
2 For example, it can be argued that as a result of the removal of the criminal sanction, the intake of public inebriates will no longer be viewed by patrol officers or the command structure as a proper or important task (Wilson, 1971:49) . Decriminalization also eliminates critical organizational incentives that motivate patrol officers to carry out this often messy and time-consuming job.
3 Indeed, the very fact that the officer is no longer being asked to enforce the criminal law provides a source of dissonance. Further, police intake of inebriates under a public health mandate requires the cooperation of two different public service bureaucracies that diverge in both organization and values. Such a fragmented authority structure is a potential impediment to goal achievement.
Thus, given the broad discretionary powers available to implementing agencies and their respective street-level bureaucrats (Davis, 1975) , we would argue that any newly formulated task that runs counter to the organizational and individual selfinterests of a critical public service bureaucracy is very unlikely to achieve full implementation unless these new mandates are supported by their own incentives at both the 2. As indicated in the authors' note, police discretion as an explanation for the police behavior discussed herein is not treated extensively in this article. There is a voluminous literature on police discretion by political scientists, sociologists, and legal and criminal justice scholars, e.g., Davis (1975); Goldstein (1960) ; La Fave (1965); Skolnick (1967) ; Wilson, J.Q. (1968) . Studies of police discretion that are particularly relevant to the enforcement of public drunkenness include Gammage et al. (1972); Bittner (1967) ; Nimmer (1971) ; Pittman and Gordon (1967) ; Rubington (1970) . 3. For example, departments have often given the same credit for such arrests that they award for other misdemeanors and for traffic citations. Jerry V. Wilson, the former Police Chief of Washington, D.C., has noted the importance of this incentive (1975) .
administrative and street levels (Musheno et al., 1976) . In short, decriminalization introduces numerous disincentives to formal police intervention using approved means (Aaronson et al., 1977a (Aaronson et al., , 1978 . Our research design reflects the growing body of literature that merges the common threads of empirical impact analysis and public policy analysis (Dye, 1972:291-96) . This "policy impact study" empirically evaluates the impact of state judicial and legislative mandates on agency responses (Campbell and Ross, 1968; Glass et al., 1971; Ross, 1975; Zimring, 1975) . Thus we seek to contribute to correcting the "upper court bias" associated with public law research (Dolbeare, 1967) and to developing the literature of policy analysis that empirically assesses the way public agencies interpret the law (Medalie et al., 1968; Milner, 1970; Ostrom, 1973) .
II. DECRIMINALIZATION: TRACING THE PHASES AND SOURCES OF LEGAL REFORM
One can divide decriminalization proposals into those that are accompanied by treatment alternatives and those that are not (Aaronson and Sweeney, 1975; Aaronson et al., 1977c; Titus, 1973) . Although those proposals without a treatment scheme may include regulatory guidelines (e.g., gambling and obscenity laws), they are primarily intended to permit a previously prohibited activity by eliminating the criminal sanction. Alternatively, proposals linked to treatment alternatives are usually designed to provide a more effective means of regulating an activity. The movement to decriminalize public drunkenness is an example of this latter category.
Washington and Minneapolis have experienced three legal phases in the handling of public inebriates: a criminal phase, a transitional phase, and a public health phase. In both jurisdictions, the transitional phase was marked by judicial decisions that overturned convictions of chronic skid-row inebriates for drunkenness. Decriminalization and the emergence of the public health phase were the product of legislation that required the establishment of new institutions for servicing the public inebriate population.
A. Washington, D.C.
Prior to Easter v. District of Columbia (361 F.2d 50, D.C. Cir., 1966) , the public inebriate in Washington was handled within the criminal process. The usual procedure involved a police arrest for alleged violation of D.C. Code § 25-128, which made it a crime to be "drunk or intoxicated in any street, alley, park, or parking in any vehicle in or upon the same or in any place to which the public is invited or at any public gathering, and no person anywhere shall be drunk or intoxicated and disturb the peace of any person." Violations of this statute were punishable by a fine of not more than $100 and/or imprisonment for not more than 90 days.
The legal challenge to this public intoxication statute in the Easter case relied, in part, on the fundamental principle of criminal responsibility that criminal sanctions may be applied only to voluntary action (see Robinson v. California, 390 U.S. 669, 1962) . In Easter, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the defendant could not be convicted of public intoxication because, as a chronic alcoholic, he had lost the power of self-control with respect to the use of alcoholic beverages and thus, under a local statute as well as under traditional legal principles, he could not be convicted for his involuntary intoxication. 4 However, there were .factors that substantially limited the impact of this ruling. 5 It applied only to the "chronic alcoholic." Public intoxication remained a 4. The Court in Easter cited D.C. Code § 24-501 et seq. authorizing courts in the District of Columbia to take notice of the fact that a chronic alcoholic is a sick person in need of treatment and authorizing the court to order such treatment. Further, a chronic alcoholic was defined in the code as a person who has lost "self-control" because of the use of alcohol. Considering these provisions in the context of the act as a whole, the court concluded that Congress had intended that criminality should not attach where responsibility is lacking, i.e., chronic alcoholism (361 F.2d 51-53). The Court also relied heavily on Driver v. Hinnant 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966), concluding that a chronic alcoholic cannot have the mens rea necessary for criminal responsibility. It was also suggested that criminal punishment under such circumstances might offend the constitutional prescription against cruel and unusual punishment (361 F.2d 53-55 However, involuntary confinement of the public inebriate in criminal and decriminalized jurisdictions is often premised on a finding of dangerousness (see Grad et al., 1971) thereby raising a question left open by the Donaldson case-can a dangerous person be involuntarily confined where no treatment is afforded? In decriminalized jurisdictions (and many jurisdictions that were formally criminal), confinement is often limited to a short "sobering up" period. In the decrimininalized jurisdiction, treatment is usually provided if confinement continues and confinement is usually based on some consent. Of course, what constitutes "consent" for an intoxicated person is itself a difficult legal question. crime but there was increased uncertainty whether an arrest would result in a conviction. Further, the lack of any systematic therapy for the chronic inebriate resulted in a "revolving door" that was even more of a sham than the previous criminal process. The result for the police was general confusion (Wilson, 1975 ).
On August 1, 1968, the District of Columbia Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act (P.L. 90-452, 82 Stat. 618, 1968) , went into effect, a direct result of Easter and its chaotic aftermath. The Act directs all public officials in the District of Columbia to "take cognizance of the fact that public intoxication shall be handled as a public health problem rather than as a criminal offense" (Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act D.C. Code Annot. § 24-521 et seq.). Nevertheless, the statute retains the assumption that simple public intoxication is sufficient ground for public intervention regardless of the wishes of the intoxicated individual. The police are retained as the legal instument for removing intoxicated persons from the streets, but they pick up "patients" under a public health statute that reads:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person who is intoxicated in public: (1) may be taken or sent to his home or to a public or private health facility; (2) if not taken or sent to his home or such facility under paragraph one shall be taken to a detoxification center. [D.C. The Metropolitan Police Department promulgated regulations recognizing intoxication (General Order No. 8, 1968 ) and dividing intoxicated persons into three classes: (1) those not endangering the safety of themselves or other persons or property (D.C. Code § 25-218), (2) those who endanger the safety of themselves or other persons or property (D.C. Code § 25-218), and (3) those charged with criminal offenses other than those specified in D.C. Code § 25-218 (General Order No. 11, 1968) .
The police department remains the primary intake agent for all three classes. Persons picked up under the first category are taken home or to the Detox (the Detoxification Center) and no arrest notation results (other forms are substituted). Public inebriates who do endanger the safety of themselves or others (a criminal offense), are arrested and taken to the Detox, where the medical officer is given a detainer authorizing their transfer to jail when detoxified. Although those in the third category should also be taken to Detox, it lacks adequate security; therefore any person who is considered a potential escapee is presently treated like any other criminal.
Easter provided the initial catalyst for change in the legal status of public drunkenness in the District of Columbia. The general public was not significantly involved in the subsequent formulation of new policies. As with most such changes (see Bachrach and Baratz, 1970) , it is primarily attributable to an identifiable set of individuals and groups (a policy subsystem) which, for nearly twenty years, had sought a revision of the city's laws for dealing with public drunkenness.
6 Coordinated by the Washington Area Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, these forces included members of city and federal criminal justice reform commissions, the news media, civil libertarian groups, public health institutions, and alcohol reform groups. This policy subsystem was instrumental in prodding Congress to enact the Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act and has continued to serve as a watchdog over the implementation of decriminalization in the District.
Although all the coalition members backed Easter and the Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act, their reasons for supporting these reforms varied, reflecting differences in professional expertise and interest. The criminal justice reform commissions and the civil libertarians stressed constitutional protections, importance of freeing the courts from "noncriminal" responsibilities, the costs of prosecuting public inebriates, and the need to concentrate limited resources on more serious crimes. The alcoholism reform groups and officials of public health institutions emphasized the provision of emergency services for the inebriate and the role of decriminalization as a stepping stone for resocializing and rehabilitating chronic inebriates. 7 We found no indication that coalition members had discussed potential conflict among these goals despite the very real possibility that this may sabotage new governmental programs (Aaronson et al., 1977a (Aaronson et al., , 1978 Musheno et al., 1976) ..
It is important to note that the Metropolitan Police Department neither volunteered, nor was asked to participate in this policy subsystem. Some members of the coalition simply assumed that the department would be opposed to decriminalization. And Jerry Wilson, then police chief, has since explained that the department was preoccupied with other matters.
The city was in a state of crisis, with street disorders occurring or threatening to occur almost weekly, with the Poor People's Campaign 6. Interview with Mary Kidd, Executive Director, Washington Area Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, Washington, D.C. (July, 1974) . 7. None of the members of the coalition focused on the goal of keeping the streets clear of "transient" inebriates once decriminalization was introduced. We have found that this goal is often ignored by the advocates of decriminalization but becomes a significant problem for police departments once the business community and residents begin to lodge complaints.
absorbing much of the time of senior officials of the department, as well as diverting patrol officers to special details, and with sharp upward trends developing in serious crime and narcotics traffic. During 1968 and 1969, public inebriation was clearly a lesser priority for the police department specifically, or for the city, generally. [1975:15-16] Subsequent reform efforts in other jurisdictions have included police departments in the formulation of policy so as to obtain accurate information about the street activity of inebriates and assure a high level of police cooperation in implementing noncriminal alternatives. A peace or health officer may take a person into custody and transport him to a licensed hospital, mental health center or other facility equipped to treat alcoholism. If the person is not endangering himself or any other person or property the peace or health officer may transport the person to his home.
Application for admission of an intoxicated person to a hospital, mental health center or other facility equipped to treat alcoholism shall be made by the peace or health officer taking such person into custody and the application shall contain a statement given by the peace or health officer stating the circumstances under which such person was taken into custody and the reasons therefor. Such person may be admitted to a facility specified in this provision for emergency care and treatment with the consent of the institution. [Hospitalization and Commitment Act § 253A.04] Essentially, this Act provided police officers with an additional option for handling individuals intoxicated in public. No special treatment facilities for inebriates were authorized under the legislation and the health officer clause was developed to acknowledge the use of ambulance services to transport intoxicated persons.
During this transitional period, the next legal attack on the criminal processing of public inebriates came from the Minnesota courts. On April 7, 1967, Bernard Fearon was arrested for violating Minnesota Statutes § 340.96. As a defense to this charge, Fearon argued that the statute did not apply to him because he was a chronic alcoholic who, by virtue of his condition, was incapable of controlling his consumption of alcohol. The Municipal Court of Ramsey County found Fearon guilty as charged.
Fearon appealed to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, reiterating his statutory interpretation but now adding the claim that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment barred application of the statute to the chronic alcoholic who, as a symptom of his disease, appears intoxicated in public. On March 21, 1969, the state Supreme Court held that the statute did not apply to the chronic alcoholic (State v. Fearon, 238 Minn. 90, 166 N.W.2d 720, 1969) . By so ruling, the Minnesota courts recognized that chronic alcoholism is a disease to be treated, not a criminal offense that should be punished. The court based its decision on five grounds: (1) "Voluntary drinking" under § 340.96 means drinking by choice. The statute does not apply to the chronic alcoholic whose drinking is caused by his disease and therefore cannot be controlled (166 N.W.2d 720, 722-23) . (2) Although Fearon held that the Hospitalization and Commitment Act did supersede § 340.96 in the case of chronic alcoholics, it did not invalidate local ordinances. In Minneapolis, police continued to use Chapter 37.9 of the City Ordinances to arrest intoxicated persons for disorderly conduct. Like the Easter case in Washington, the Fearon decision was viewed by municipal criminal justice officials in Hennepin County as a shift in emphasis rather than an abandonment of the criminal approach to public drunkeness.
But on March 29, 1971, the Minnesota Legislature completely eliminated the criminal processing of public drunkenness (Minn. Stats. § 340.961, eff. July 1, 1971). The new provision stated that drunkenness was not a crime, and nullified any inconsistent municipal ordinance. It left law enforcement personnel with only three choices for dealing with a drunken person in a public place: (a) take the person into "custody" and transport him to a facility equipped to treat alcoholism and provide for emergency care (for a maximum of 72 hours of involuntary treatment); (b) take the person home if he is not endangering himself, others, or property; or (c) leave the person where he is found.
The legislature also committed resources for the establishment of an alternative care and treatment system. Each area mental health board throughout the state was made responsible for providing one or more detoxification centers for the custody, care, and treatment of inebriates and drug dependent persons (Minn. Stat. Ann., § § 245.68(h)-(k), Supp. 1977) . Hennepin County opened its first facility on the date decriminalization became effective.
On May 23, 1973, additional legislation outlined the permanent administrative structure, broadened both the services available to individuals with drinking problems and the classes of individuals who qualify as recipients, and explicitly sanctioned civilian pick-up of public drunks (Treatment for Alcohol and Drug Abuse Act, Minn. Stat. Ann. § § 254A.01-.17, Supp. 1972) .
In Minnesota the policy subsystem supporting decriminalization included the following forces: the traditional alcohol reform lobby (e.g., alcohol treatment groups, clergy); state commissions and associations; civic groups (e.g., the League of Women Voters); legal professionals; and mental health professionals.
12 Individuals who pressed for decriminalization were often affiliated with more than one. For example, members of Alcoholics Anonymous might also be professionals in the state and county bureaucracies that service alcoholics because the state's alcoholism treatment program has permitted recovered alcoholics to be therapists and care givers ever since 1954.13
The reformers directed their efforts at three levels of the governmental process: the courts, the state legislature, and county officials. Thus even prior to decriminalization, informal approaches to the noncriminal handling of public drunks emerged in local jurisdictions (e.g., the Hennepin County PreCourt Screening Committee). Reform activity also accounted for the smooth transition from a criminal to a treatment approach in Hennepin County. A citizen's task force with liaison to professionals was appointed by the county commissioners in anticipation of decriminalization. The task force and its professional volunteers conducted the search for the first receiving center, hired staff, and purchased all the necessary materials prior to July 1, 1971.1 4 Given the policy subsystem identified above, it is not surprising that the resulting legislation sought three goals: ending the jurisdiction of local courts over this problem, improving emergency services for the public inebriate, and increasing the opportunities for resocializing public inebriates. The primacy of public health concerns was assured by entrusting implementation of the decriminalization mandate to a broad-based agency dominated by public health professionals, the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Chemical Dependency.
As in the District of Columbia, the Minneapolis Police Department was only marginally involved in deliberations con- cerning decriminalization. Thus, no member of the policy subsystem spoke for the critical community value of keeping the street clear of transient inebriates.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION
To test the impact of decriminalization, we carried out an "interrupted time-series quasi-experiment" (Campbell and Stanley, 1963 ) based on a "stratified multiple-group single-I design" (Glass et al., 1975) . Specifically, we collected monthly rates of arrest for public drunkenness (pre-decriminalization) and of police deliveries to detoxification facilities (postdecriminalization) for the two experimental cities: Washington, D.C., (a high arrest jurisdiction) and Minneapolis (a moderate arrest jurisdiction).1 5 We also collected monthly arrest rates for two control cities that have not implemented decriminalization: Houston and San Francisco.
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As many scholars well know, time-series quasiexperiments often require a laborious effort to find relevant, reliable data that provide enough observations to allow sophisticated analysis.
17 Since we were studying four different municipalities, we were not able to collect an equivalent number of monthly observations for each or to observe them over the same time period. Furthermore, the date of decriminalization is different in the two experimental jurisdictions. Graphs 1 through 4 depict these differences (see the Appendix for monthly intake rates for all jurisdictions) and also indicate the placement of the intervention line for each experimental jurisdiction based on two criteria: the effective date of decriminalization in each jurisdiction, and the date that the public health facility opened to receive clients. In Minneapolis, the Alcoholism Receiving Center opened on the date decriminalization became effective-July 1, 1971. In Washington, D.C., decriminalization became effective on August 1, 1968, 15. By "high arrest jurisdiction," we mean a jurisdiction whose police department has made yearly drunkenness arrests of over 2,000 per 100,000 population (Washington had a yearly average of 5,522 per 100,000 for 1966, 1967). By "moderate arrest jurisdiction," we mean a jurisdiction whose police department has made yearly drunkenness arrests of less than 2,000 per 100,000 population (Minneapolis had a yearly average of 1,625 per 100,000 for 1966, 1967). 16. We selected control jurisdictions that would be comparable to our experimental jurisdictions in terms of the following criteria: (1) projected change in policy (whether or not a jurisdiction was anticipating decriminalization); (2) citywide socioeconomic indicators; (3) nature of the public drunkenness problem; and (4) availability of monthly arrest data. Houston is roughly matched with Washington, D.C., and San Francisco with Minneapolis. For a full description of our site selection process see Aaronson et al. (1977b) . 17. Observation requirements for sophisticated analysis are discussed in Campbell and Stanley (1963) . a. Based on official statistics of San Francisco Police Department, San Francisco, California. b. The monthly arrest rate representing the midpoint of the monthly data collected was designated as "0." All other monthly arrest rates were recalculated to represent a percentage increase or decrease from the midpoint. The actual monthly police arrest rates for San Francisco are listed in the Appendix.
but the Detoxification Center was not fully operational until November 1; we designated the latter as the point of intervention.
IV. FINDINGS
The data provide considerable support for our decriminalization hypothesis. The intake rate in Washington, D.C., seems to fall prior to the point of intervention, apparently in response to the confusion produced by Easter (see Graph 1). According to former police chief, Jerry Wilson, "there was some concern among police immediately after the Easter decision that a police officer might become civilly liable because of the perceived requirement for determining who was an alcoholic and who was not before each arrest of an inebriate " (1975:15) . However, the drop in arrests following Easter does not represent a statistically significant change in the level of intake.
18 On the other hand, the computer program, CORREL, which computes autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations for raw data (see supra note 18) shows a statistically significant reduction of 764 in the estimated level of police intakes per month following decriminalization.' 9 In Minneapolis, where the mean monthly arrest rate under the criminal law had been much lower than in Washington (641 compared to 3152), the reduction of 263 in the estimated level of police intakes per month is even more dramatic. 20 A simple visual scanning of the data from our control jurisdictions shows that no similar change occurs in police departments where criminal sanctions against public drunkenness are unaltered (see Graphs 3 and 4). 21 Does this mean, then, that one effect of decriminalization is increased neglect of the public inebriate population? Rather than concluding from the above analysis that significantly more inebriates are being left on the street since decriminalization, we also investigated a series of alternative dispositions and control factors that could not be analyzed under the stratified multiple-group single-I design. The results demonstrate the 18. Fortunately, Professor Gene V. Glass of the University of Colorado has developed a computer program, CORREL, which computes autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations for raw data. CORREL also includes a seasonal option for identifying cyclic series. He applied his program to our data for Washington, D.C., and Minneapolis. The data were analyzed as p=o, d=l, q=1 (integrated moving averages) with a seasonal component (cycle=12). Using Easter as an intervention pointed for Washington, D.C., this analysis produced a T=1.05 with 106 degrees of freedom which is not statistically significant (furthermore, the estimated intervention effect is a positive, not a negative, 337). 19. T=3.20, significant at .001 with 106 degrees of freedom. 20. T=-4.84, significant at .001 with 102 degrees of freedom. 21. Professor Glass advised and we concurred that visual scanning of the control jurisdiction data in Graphs 3 and 4 adequately establishes that no similar effect is taking place.
importance of "microanalysis" in tracing the impact of legal mandates on adminstrative agencies.
For each experimental jurisdiction we analyzed whether a change in the recidivism rate or in the size of the drinking population after decriminalization might explain the apparent reduction in police pick-ups.
We also examined alternative dispositions. The reform legislation in both jurisdictions allows an individual to admit himself to the detoxification facilities and grants the police two other options: to take the person home or to deliver him to a facility equipped to handle alcoholism (e.g., a hospital). The Minnesota legislation also authorizes civil pick-up of public inebriates, and the Hennepin County Alcoholism Receiving Center staffs a Civil Pick-up Van designed to reduce pressure on the Minneapolis Police Department in the downtown section of the city (First Precinct) where it is most acute. 22 Finally, in addition to these approved responses, we investigated whether the police in either jurisdiction are charging public inebriates with other misdemeanors such as disorderly conduct or vagrancy.
A. Washington, D.C.
In Washington, D.C., we did not expect microanalysis to require substantial alteration in our original finding of a significant decline in the number of public inebriates formally handled by the state. Although the new legislation authorized alternative dispositions, we detected no administrative initiative on the part of public health or police personnel to implement any of these options. Indeed, our exhaustive evaluation of these alternatives revealed neither records nor other evidence that they were used extensively in the post-reform era (Aaronson et al., 1977b:116-45) .
As for control factors, the size of the problem drinking population in Washington, D.C., has shown a yearly increase ever since 1960, when such estimates were first calculated by the public health community in the District. 23 Thus the decline in police intake following decriminalization cannot be attributed to a decrease in public intoxication. Our dependent variable in the foregoing research has been "rate of intake" rather than the number of different individuals picked up in each period. Perhaps the same number of different individuals is being picked up in the two periods but the rate of recidivism has declined after the reform. Although this is unlikely since decriminalization restricts involuntary commitment to 72 hours, we estimated the number of individuals the police processed in four years prior to the reform (1964, 1966, 1967, 1968) 24 and compared these findings with the yearly recidivism rates for the D.C. Detoxification Center  (1969-1973) .25 As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the recidivism rates 24. Since police have no record of the number of individuals they processed for this charge prior to the reform, we used the index to the records of the D.C. Court of General Sessions which lists the cases for each calendar year in alphabetical order by individual name. Individuals with multiple arrests are more likely to be processed in the courts, whereas more affluent single offenders may prefer to forfeit their collateral rather than be exposed to prosecution. Therefore, we have overestimated prereform recidivism, biasing the evidence so as not to favor our research hypothesis. 25. Statistics are available for the number of individuals admitted to the Detoxification Center each year after the reform.
are uniformly higher following the reform, and therefore the revolving door argument fails to explain the discrepancy in police intake between the two periods. [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] . The yearly arrest rate for the first full year of decriminalization (1969) was designated as "0." All other arrest rates were recalculated to represent a percentage increase or decrease from that year's rate.
Finally, we investigated the rival hypothesis that the police and the courts have been processing public inebriates under other criminal offenses since the reform. All court personnel interviewed denied that this was the case; indeed many pointed out that removal of public drunkeness as a criminal offense was primarily responsible for reducing the case backlog in the Criminal Division of the Superior Court. Some argued that because disorderly conduct and vagrancy had previously been charged against public inebriates the reform had reduced these offenses as well.
We obtained official police statistics to probe these assertions, and found that disorderly conduct and vagrancy charges have decreased substantially in the post-reform periods (see Graphs 5 and 6). The sharp increase in disorderly conduct arrests in fiscal year 1971 (see Graph 5) is probably attributable to police actions against antiwar demonstrations, since more than 9,000 of the arrests took place during the month of the "May Day Demonstrations" in Washington, D.C., and the other, frequent antiwar demonstrations during the early 1970s could well explain the failure of the disorderly conduct arrest rate to return to the 1969-70 level. But despite the numerous arrests of demonstrators, disorderly conduct arrest levels are consistently lower after the reform than they were before it, with the single exception of the 1971 May Day inflation. The virtual disappearance of vagrancy arrests (see Graph 6) may well be due to the declining use of this offense as a result of court decisions holding such statutes unconstitutional (see, e.g., Papachriston v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 1972) . In any case, the data do not suggest the use of vagrancy as a substitute for the public drunkenness charge.
If the police are paying less attention to the problem of public inebriation, what criteria guide their allocation of resources, and how have these changed since the reform? We hypothesized that the decline in the number of inebriates formally processed by the police would be accompanied by an increasing emphasis on the emergency case, the skid-row drunk, for whom some action is required and no adequate alternative is readily available.
Washington, D.C., is the only jurisdiction in which we were able to investigate the "qualitative impact" of decriminalization by studying existing reports on the public inebriate population and collecting original data on the characteristics of those processed for public intoxication before and after the reform. The Committee on Prisons, Probation and Parole found that 58.2 percent of the individuals picked up for public intoxication in the District of Columbia during 1956 either forfeited their collateral, were fined or were released (1957:89). The Committee contrasted these "social drinkers" with 41.8 percent of inebriates committed to the Workhouse, whom it divided into three categories.
Many are relatively youthful offenders who are simply intoxicated at the time of arrest; a somewhat larger group are problem drinkers, bordering on chronic alcoholism-but who have families, job prospects, and a desire to get back home and back to work; finally, the great majority of the approximately 14,000 intoxicants committed each year to the Workhouse are chronic skid-row alcoholics. [1957:103] The report thus indicates that the police picked up a range of public inebriates and did not concentrate solely on the chronic skid-row inebriate. On the other hand, a study of those entering the Alcoholic Detoxification Center after the reform reveals a more homogenous population.
The composite picture is that of a black man, not married, who tends to be in his mid-forties, having completed ten years of education, of low socio-economic status ....
He has an average of 18 prior admissions to the Alcoholic Detoxification Center. [Research and Statistics Division, 1974] 26 We then drew random samples of individuals arrested by the police during two years prior to the reform (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) a. Major shifts in separation and divorce rates have occurred throughout society, which may partly explain this difference.
26.
These 18 admissions represent a lifetime experience for 500 public inebriates and should not be confused with the annual recidivism rates reported in Table 2 . 27. Police arrest records are generally filled with inaccuracies because officers rely on the integrity of the arrested individual for background information. Nevertheless, these are the only available source for these data.
and of those admitted to the Detoxification Center during five subsequent years , comparing their backgrounds in terms of indicators often associated with skid-row inebriates: low socioeconomic status and undersocialization (Straus, 1974) (we were unable to measure the third indicator, institutional dependency). There are few significant differences in most background variables between these two periods, with the exception of marital status. The composite picture of the public inebriate admitted to the Detoxification Center is a black male in his mid-forties, single or separated, with little education and low occupational skills, who resides in those parts of the city with the highest level of health problems.
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These traits characterize the skid-row public inebriate. Others rarely find their way into the Detoxification Center. Indeed former Police Chief Jerry Wilson believed that one purpose of the Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act was to create an alternative means for servicing skid-row inebriates:
Of course, the language of the ARA avoids saying directly that it is the homeless, derelict inebriate who is to be taken to the Detoxification Center for treatment. But when you think of the discussions that led up to the ARA and to its actual language, you can construct an argument that the underlying intent is that the Detoxification Center will deal primarily with the derelict. For example, there is the provision for taking or sending the intoxicated individual home as an alternative to the Detoxification Center. Clearly, this is intended and functions to excuse most persons who have homes from what really amounts to an arrest and incarceration. In practice, of course, the police rarely take inebriates home, but instead send them home by putting them in taxicabs or turning them over to friends or else indirectly send them home simply by letting them go on their way so long as they are not staggering through traffic. [1975:19] Despite the limitations of our datai, it appears one consequence of decriminalization has been to focus the energies of the police'upon skid-row alcoholics, to the neglect of other public inebriates. This is disturbing for two reasons. First, it frustrates the primary goal of the reform-rehabilitation and resocialization. These policies are least likely to succeed with the skid-row alcoholic, who is being admitted to the Detoxification Center, and most likely to succeed with those who are being overlooked by the police. Second, it increases, rather than 28. We plotted the addresses of those admitted to the Center in terms of the service areas of the Department of Human Resources. The service area with the highest rate of socioeconomic health related problems (the Model Cities Area, which also contains the Center) was the residence of 29.1 percent of admittees; 63.7 percent of admittees reside in the three most deprived service areas.
reduces, the violation of constitutional principles by depriving skid-row alcoholics of equal protection of law.
B. Minneapolis
As in the District of Columbia, neither of the control factors explains the discrepancy in intake between the two periods. The problem drinking population has slightly increased since decriminalization 29 and public drunkenness recidivism rates are substantially higher (see Table 4 ). Although we found little incidence of home deliveries or use of other health facilities by the Minneapolis Police (Aaronson et al., 1977b:248-53) , our investigation of alternative dispositions by the Alcoholism Receiving Center (ARC) did produce significant findings. Unlike most treatment programs which rely almost totally on police departments for their intake, ARC's staff has aggressively sought to attract clients. 30 The development of the Civil Pick-up Service was designed to reduce pressure on the Minneapolis Police Department in the downtown section of the city (First Precinct) where street inebriate problems are most acute (Boche, 1975 [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] .
31.
Interview with Paul Thorne, Director, Alcoholism Receiving Center, Minneapolis (June 5, 1975) . 32. Only yearly data are available: T = .16, df = 11 + 5 -2 = 14, p =N.S. Thus, there is no significant difference in pick-ups between the two periods when one adds the intake generated by the efforts of the Alcoholism Receiving Center staff.
the initiation of the Civilian Pick-up service "the Minneapolis Police Department accounted for 40% of the total admissions and 60% of admissions from 4:00 P.M. to 12:00 P.M." (Boche, 1975:1) . Thereafter "the Pick-up Team transported almost 50% of the total admissions to the Center and 80% of police and team admissions combined" for the same hours (Boche, 1975:2) . Statistics collected by ARC show that the Civilian Pick-up Service has actually increased total admissions while further reducing police involvement. For example, in June through August of 1974 "the total number of admissions to the Center increased 17% (from 2299 to 2689) while police referrals were reduced to 480 admissions" (Boche, 1975:4) . During the first eight months of 1974, Civilian Pick-up admissions increased from 19 percent of total admissions to 27 percent while police admissions were reduced from 23 to 17 percent (Boche, 1975:4) .
It should be stressed, however, that persons who admit themselves to the ARC (approximately half of the total admissions during this period) may be a different population from the typical skid-row inebriate. To the extent that this is so, we have not yet fully accounted for the inebriate population previously handled by the police. Perhaps the police have diverted their energies to controlling public inebriates with minor criminal charges. Indeed, public health officials suggested that subsequent to decriminalization the police were arresting a considerable number of public inebriates for disorderly conduct and relasing them before a court appearance was required. 33 We obtained official police statistics on disorderly conduct and vagrancy. The findings displayed in Graphs 8 and 9 strongly indicate that the police are arresting public inebriates for disorderly conduct. Although vagrancy arrests have shown a steady decline since 1960, disorderly conduct arrests have significantly increased since decriminalization.
3 4 From 1960 to 1966, the yearly average for disorderly conduct arrests was 697; during the transitional period following the introduction of precourt screening this average increased to 1167; since decriminalization. it has jumped to 1875. Thus, in order to keep the streets clear of skid-row inebriates, and because of overcrowding at the Alcoholism Receiving Center, the police have come to rely on disorderly conduct arrests as a means of control. Annual Reports, 1963 . The yearly arrest rate for the year of decriminalization (1971) was designated as "0." All other arrest rates were recalculated to represent a percentage increase or decrease from that year's rate. 
V. CONCLUSION
Our multiple time-series analysis does confirm a statistically significant decline in the number of public inebriates formally handled by the police in the manner designated by the "law in the books." This finding raises serious doubts about the use of police to implement noncriminal regulations and lends considerable support to our proposition that decriminalization introduces a mass of disincentives to formally approved police intervention. However, our comparative analysis does not lead to the conclusion that more inebriates necessarily will be left on the street after decriminalization. As revealed in our microanalyses of the experimental jurisdictions, proactive behavior by the public health community (e.g., the use of a civilian intake van and the encouragement of self-admissions) does compensate for reduced police attention in Minneapolis.
Certain environmental differences between the two cities may partially account for the disparity in pickup practices. Until the late 1960s, the Minneapolis Police Department and community leaders tolerated the existence of "safe zones" where skid-row inebriates could freely congregate and reside unnoticed by most citizens. A small "hobo haven" was located on property owned by the Great Northern Railroad, but the greatest number of transient drinkers lived on Nicollet Island, situated in the Mississippi River where it passes through Minneapolis. Over the years this area evolved into an unofficial shanty town for transients, with flophouses, shacks, and even liquor stores. Although a few old houses still stand, the city has now virtually leveled the island and is redeveloping it as an outdoor art and recreation area. This drove the inebriate population into the thriving downtown commercial and business district, which was revitalized in the early 1970s. Strong business protests as well as increased numbers of complaints have placed the police under heavy pressure to keep the streets clear of inebriates who offend shoppers. 35 This probably explains the police department's use of disorderly conduct charges to detain public inebriates overnight when the detoxification facility is full or is unwilling to handle some of the more troublesome transients.
In the District of Columbia, the Metropolitan Police Department can rely on more informal mechanisms to keep public inebriates out of the downtown tourist and business district. This important commercial area is part of a larger subdivision 35 . Interview with Paul Thorne (supra note 31).
of Washington that contains many pockets of extreme poverty characterized by abandoned buildings and vacant lots (Aaronson et al., 1977b:112-13) . These blighted area neighborhoods are within easy walking distance of the major commercial district. At present they are "safe zones" for public inebriates and police use such informal tactics as "moving transients along" in order to keep them away from commercially important thoroughfares. Direct observation by our research teams, as well as interviews with police and public health officials in the city, confirm the conclusion that public inebriates are permitted to congregage in these areas (Aaronson et al., 1977b:141) .
Differences in the availability of public health resources for inebriates may also help to account for the higher intake rate in Minneapolis. Public health officials in both communities have been outspoken about the limited bed space in their facilities. But in 1974, Minneapolis opened a second facility, Southside Detox, principally serving the Native American population in the Model Cities area. 36 And Hennepin County public health officials have recently drawn up plans for a series of "satellite facilities" to decentralize services to the public inebriate population. In Washington by contrast, public health officials have obtained no increase in resources since the initial funding of the Detoxification Center.
Finally, decriminalization provided the police command in Washington with an opportunity to shift priorities at a time when the department was under heavy pressure to handle massive demonstrations and fight street crime. The Minneapolis Police Department experienced no such competing demands for its services. On the contrary, urban renewal coupled with the loss of the criminal sanction for public drunkenness placed increased pressures on the Minneapolis force to remove inebriates from the streets. Neither the proponents of decriminalization nor the police fully anticipated these historically specific factors. 37 36. Interview with Marvin Mannypenny, Director, Southside Detox, Minneapolis (July 7, 1975) . 37. In this paper we have not attempted to develop alternative solutions to the problems created by decriminalization. However, we have written a prescriptive paper on this subject, see Aaronson et al. (1977a Aaronson et al. ( , 1978 .
MONTHLY POLICE INTAKE RATES FOR ALL CITIES
Washington, D.C.
